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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., the Minnesota Supreme 
Court decided that an airplane manufacturer’s duty to warn does 
not include a duty to provide training.1 The court also decided that 
a manufacturer cannot assume a duty to train when its obligation is 
created only by contract.2 
This case note will begin with a brief survey of three areas of 
law relevant to the Glorvigen decision: the duty to warn, the 
 
        †   Peter D. Kieselbach is a second year law student at William Mitchell 
College of Law. 
 1.  816 N.W.2d 572, 583 (Minn. 2012). 
 2.  Id. at 584. 
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2013] AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO GLORVIGEN 225 
economic loss doctrine, and the educational malpractice doctrine.3 
Next, it will provide a summary of the facts, procedural history, and 
holding from the case.4 Finally, it will present an argument that 
although the supreme court correctly decided that the duty to warn 
does not include the duty to train, the majority erred in its 
resolution of the assumed-duty issue.5 Rather than concluding that 
a contract cannot give rise to liability in tort, the court should have 
concluded that appellants’ claims were barred by the educational 
malpractice doctrine.6 By not resolving the case in this manner, the 
court missed an opportunity to officially reject educational 
malpractice as a valid cause of action. Instead, the court created a 
new precedent that may allow future manufacturers to avoid 
liability in tort for personal injury simply on the basis of a contract.7 
II. HISTORY 
A. Duty to Warn 
In Minnesota, a manufacturer may be liable for harm caused 
by a defective product.8 One way that a product can be defective is 
if it fails to include adequate warnings and instructions for safe 
use.9 The general purpose underlying this duty to warn is to 
provide “incentives for manufacturers to achieve optimal levels of 
safety.”10 Some products are unavoidably dangerous, either because 
achieving absolute safety is impossible or because it is cost 
prohibitive.11 A lawnmower, for example, needs sharp blades in 
order to perform its function of cutting grass. However, without 
 
 3.  See infra Parts II.A–C. 
 4.  See infra Part III. 
 5.  See infra Part IV.  
 6.  See infra Part IV. 
 7.  See infra Part IV. 
 8.  See, e.g., Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 1984); McCormack 
v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967). See generally 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 1 (1998); 20A2 BRENT A. OLSON, 
MINNESOTA PRACTICE: BUSINESS LAW DESKBOOK § 33:5 (2012 ed.) (providing a 
general survey of product liability law in Minnesota).  
 9.  See 27 MICHAEL K. STEENSON, J. DAVID PRINCE & SARAH L. BREW, MINNESOTA 
PRACTICE: PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 4.1 (2012 ed.). Other categories of product 
defects include design defects and manufacturing defects. See generally 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2.  
 10.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. a. 
 11.  See id. (“Many product-related accident costs can be eliminated only by 
excessively sacrificing product features that make products useful and desirable.”). 
2
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol40/iss1/7
 
226 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1 
blades, the product is useless. The duty to warn accomplishes the 
dual purpose of minimizing the risk of injury to the consumer 
while also preserving the utility and economic viability of the 
product.12  
Minnesota’s approach to the duty to warn has evolved over the 
last sixty years.13 Historically, a person injured as a result of a 
defective warning could only recover if he or she was in privity of 
contract with the manufacturer.14 This rule, in effect, precluded 
anyone except for the direct purchaser from bringing a claim for 
failure to warn.15 Liability was also premised solely on theories of 
negligence, breach of contract, and breach of warranty.16 
In 1967 in McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., the Minnesota 
Supreme Court shifted course and adopted a strict products 
liability framework.17 The plaintiff in McCormack was a three-year-
old child who suffered severe burns after knocking over a vaporizer 
filled with boiling water.18 In the instruction manual, the 
manufacturer wrote that the vaporizer was “safe,” “practically 
foolproof,” and implied that it “could be left unattended in a 
child’s room.”19 Relying on these instructions, the child’s parents 
positioned the device next to the child’s bed.20 At trial, the 
manufacturer asserted that the plaintiff’s failure to warn claim 
should be barred because (1) it was not in privity of contract with 
the child,21 and (2) the child’s parents were negligent in causing 
 
 12.  See id. (“Society benefits most when the right, or optimal, amount of 
product safety is achieved.”). 
 13.  The duty to warn was first recognized in Minnesota in Hartmon v. Nat’l 
Heater Co., 240 Minn. 264, 60 N.W.2d 804 (1953). The court held that “[w]here a 
manufacturer undertakes by printed instructions to advise of the proper method 
of using his chattel, he assumes the responsibility of giving accurate and adequate 
information with respect thereto, and his failure in this respect may constitute 
negligence.” Id. at 271–72, 60 N.W.2d at 810.  
 14.  See 27 STEENSON, PRINCE & BREW, supra note 9, §§ 1.2–.4. 
 15.  See id. 
 16.  See, e.g., Westerberg v. Sch. Dist. No. 792, 276 Minn. 1, 148 N.W.2d 312 
(1967); Pietrus v. Watkins Co., 229 Minn. 179, 38 N.W.2d 799 (1949). 
 17.  278 Minn. 322, 323, 154 N.W.2d 488, 491 (1967). Strict products liability, 
as a general rule, holds manufacturers accountable for injuries without proof of 
“negligence or intent to harm.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 998 (9th ed. 2009). It is 
based on the notion that manufacturers have “an absolute duty to make” safe 
products. Id. 
 18.  278 Minn. at 326–27, 154 N.W.2d at 493. 
 19.  Id. at 325, 154 N.W.2d at 492. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. at 337, 154 N.W.2d at 499. 
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the accident.22 In rejecting these arguments, the supreme court 
concluded: 
[I]n our view, enlarging a manufacturer’s liability to those 
injured by its products more adequately meets public-
policy demands to protect consumers from the inevitable 
risks of bodily harm created by mass production and 
complex marketing conditions. In a case such as this, 
subjecting a manufacturer to liability without proof of 
negligence or privity of contract, as the rule intends, 
imposes the cost of injury resulting from a defective 
product upon the maker, who can both most effectively 
reduce or eliminate the hazard to life and health, and 
absorb and pass on such costs, instead of upon the 
consumer, who possesses neither the skill nor the means 
necessary to protect himself adequately from either the 
risk of injury or its disastrous consequences.23 
The court’s decision in McCormack corresponded with a concurrent 
“national shift [towards] strict liability in tort.”24 
Minnesota’s adherence to strict products liability in failure to 
warn cases, however, did not last long.25 Although courts have 
persisted in using strict liability language, in practice, the duty has 
been construed according to negligence principles.26 Courts have 
 
 22.  Id. at 341, 154 N.W.2d at 501. 
 23.  Id. at 338, 154 N.W.2d at 500. 
 24.  Mike Steenson, The Character of the Minnesota Tort System,  
33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 239, 253 (2006). 
 25.  George W. Soule & Jacqueline M. Moen, Failure to Warn in Minnesota, the 
New Restatement on Products Liability, and the Application of the Reasonable Care 
Standard, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 389, 391 (1995) (“After adoption of strict 
liability . . . the Minnesota Supreme Court struggled for a time in its definition of 
failure-to-warn theory.”); see Steenson, supra note 24, at 254 (commenting that 
strict products liability had been “reeled back to a negligence base” by 1984).  
 26.  See Germann v. F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., 395 N.W.2d 922, 926 n.4 
(Minn. 1986) (“[T]his court has adopted the position that strict liability for failure 
to warn is based upon principles of negligence.”); Soule & Moen, supra note 25, 
at 391 (“[I]n the 1980s, Minnesota courts . . . adopted a reasonable care standard 
for . . . failure-to-warn cases.”); Mike Steenson, A Comparative Analysis of Minnesota 
Products Liability Law and the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 
24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 22 (1998) (“The supreme court has stated that strict 
liability principles apply in failure to warn cases and has required claimants to 
elect between negligence and strict liability theories. Yet, the court has also stated 
that negligence principles apply in strict liability context. As a result, absent any 
indication that the court intends to establish real distinctions between negligence 
and strict liability in failure to warn cases, the underlying basis of recovery is the 
same, regardless of the label.”); J. David Prince, New Developments in the Duty to 
Warn: A Recent Minnesota Supreme Court Case Clarified Many Aspects of the Law 
4
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recognized the difficulty of imposing liability without at least some 
consideration for factors such as the foreseeability of harm, the 
potential severity of the harm, the effectiveness of a warning, and 
the cost of including a warning relative to its benefits.27 
Unlike other categories of product defect, there is no objective 
warning standard.28 
Presently, the duty to warn in Minnesota is applied as follows: a 
manufacturer “has a duty to warn end users of a dangerous product 
if it is reasonably foreseeable that an injury could occur in its use.”29 
This “duty to warn includes the duty to give adequate instructions 
for the safe use of the product.”30 Whether or not a duty to warn 
exists is a question of law for the court.31 If a court decides that 
there is a duty, a jury must determine if the warning was adequate.32 
An adequate warning is one that “(1) attract[s] the attention of 
those that the product could harm; (2) explain[s] the mechanism 
and mode of injury; and (3) provide[s] instructions on ways to 
safely use the product to avoid injury.”33 Like all other negligence 
claims, a plaintiff must also prove causation and damages. 
B. Economic Loss Doctrine 
As a general rule, a manufacturer who has breached a contract 
duty by selling or distributing a defective product cannot be sued in 
tort for pure economic loss.34 Instead, the aggrieved party must 
 
Governing Product Liability Failure-to-Warn Cases, but May Also Have Provided the Basis 
to Argue that the Supplier’s Duty to Warn Has Been Broadened, BENCH & B. MINN., 
Nov. 2004, at 16, 17 (“Negligence and so-called ‘strict liability’ claims in failure-to-
warn cases have merged in Minnesota law.”). 
 27.  For model Minnesota jury instructions on the failure to warn 
incorporating some of these factors, see 4A MICHAEL K. STEENSON & PETER V. 
KNAPP, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES—CIVIL § 75.25 
(5th ed. 2009). 
 28.  Cf. Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 622 (Minn. 1984) (commenting 
that in the case of a manufacturing flaw, “an objective standard exists—the flawless 
product—by which a jury can measure the alleged defect”). 
 29.  Gray v. Badger Mining Corp., 676 N.W.2d 268, 274 (Minn. 2004). 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Germann, 395 N.W.2d at 924; see also Balder v. Haley, 399 N.W.2d 77, 81 
(Minn. 1987). 
 32.  Balder, 399 N.W.2d at 81.  
 33.  Gray, 676 N.W.2d at 274. 
 34.  See MINN. STAT. § 604.101, subdiv. 3 (2012) (“A buyer may not bring a 
product defect tort claim against a seller for compensatory damages unless a 
defect in the goods sold or leased caused harm to the buyer’s tangible personal 
property other than the goods or to the buyer’s real property.”); Hapka v. Paquin 
5
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pursue a remedy for breach of contract or breach of warranty.35 
This requirement is called the economic loss doctrine; its purpose 
is to “preserve[] the boundary between tort and contract law.”36 
Although the economic loss doctrine has a long and sometimes 
perplexing history, it has been widely accepted in Minnesota.37 
A central function of the economic loss doctrine is to promote 
certainty in contracting.38 Certainty is desirable because it allows 
parties, particularly businesses, to accurately forecast and plan for 
the future.39 The doctrine fosters certainty by mandating that all 
disputes involving economic loss be decided according to the rules 
of contract.40 When parties know what rules will be applied in 
advance, they can allocate the risk of loss with knowledge that their 
 
Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683, 691 (Minn. 1990) (holding that “there is no tort liability 
for the damage to the potato crop grown with the defective seed” because “[t]his is 
economic loss”), superseded by statute, MINN. STAT. § 604.10(a) (2012), as stated in 
Kietzer v. Land O’Lakes, No. C1-01-1334, 2002 WL 233746 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 
19, 2002). See generally Lloyd F. Smith Co., v. Den-Tal-Ez, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 11, 15 
(Minn. 1992) (noting that pure economic loss arises when a product “fails to 
function as it should” and includes “consequential damages for repair and loss of 
profits resulting from inability to use the defective product during the period of its 
replacement or repair”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 589 (9th ed. 2009) 
(defining economic loss “in a products-liability suit . . . [as] the cost of repair or 
replacement of defective property, as well as commercial loss for the property’s 
inadequate value and consequent loss of profits or use”).  
 35.  See Walter E. Judge, Jr. & Eric A. Poehlmann, Breach of a Contract or a Tort? 
The Economic Loss Rule, FOR DEF., Mar. 2003, at 56 (“Simply stated, the rule 
provides that where a plaintiff’s loss is purely economic, tort claims are barred and 
the plaintiff is limited to his or her contractual or warranty remedies.”). 
 36.  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 572 N.W.2d 321, 324 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1997); see 80 S. Eighth St. Ltd. P’ship v. Carey-Can., Inc., 
486 N.W.2d 393, 395–96 (Minn.) (“Tort actions and contract actions protect 
different interests. Through a tort action, the duty of certain conduct is imposed 
by law and not necessarily by the will or intention of the parties. The duty may be 
owed to all those within the range of harm, or to a particular class of people. 
On the other hand, contract actions protect the interests in having promises 
performed. Contract obligations are imposed because of conduct of the parties 
manifesting consent, and are owed only to the specific parties named in the 
contract.” (citation omitted)), amended by 492 N.W.2d 256 (Minn. 1992). 
 37.  For a detailed history of the economic loss doctrine in Minnesota, see 
Cortney G. Sylvester, Economic Loss: Commercial Contract Law Lives, 
27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 417, 423–37 (2000), and Jacquelyn K. Brunmeier, 
Death by Footnote: The Life and Times of Minnesota’s Economic Loss Doctrine, 
19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 871 (1993). 
 38.  See Sylvester, supra note 37, at 420 (“The principal policy basis for the 
doctrine is maintaining a uniform and predictable body of commercial law.”). 
 39.  See id. at 418. 
 40.  See id. at 420–21. 
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bargained-for allocation will be “give[n] effect.”41 This supports 
marketplace efficiency. 
Tort claims are generally excluded from actions involving 
economic loss because they “interfere with enforcement of the 
contract terms.”42 Agreements to limit or disclaim liability for 
economic loss, for example, would lose all effect if parties were 
nevertheless permitted to sue the breaching party in tort.43 
The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), which governs commercial 
transactions, “would become nothing more than a fallback 
position, the residual remedies to which parties and courts resort 
when no tort theory quite fits.”44 The economic loss doctrine thus 
safeguards contract terms “by excluding tort remedies from broad 
categories of commercial [and consumer] disputes.”45 
The doctrine’s tort bar does not, however, cover claims 
involving personal injury.46 A party injured by a defective product is 
permitted to sue the manufacturer in tort, notwithstanding the 
contract. This exception, which has been recognized by the 
Minnesota Supreme Court and legislature,47 is based on three 
principal public policy considerations. 
 
 41.  Id. at 423. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  See Judge & Poehlmann, supra note 35 (“[T]ort law should not be used to 
redress grievances relating to whether a product met the performance 
expectations of the purchaser.”). 
 44.  Sylvester, supra note 37, at 421. The UCC has specific rules that govern 
the time limit to bring a claim, how to give notice of a claim, and what remedies 
may be sought. See generally MINN. STAT. § 336.2 (2012). A tort claim would, in 
essence, constitute an end-run around these requirements. 
 45.  Sylvester, supra note 37, at 421. 
 46.  See Ralph A. Anzivino, The False Dilemma of the Economic Loss Doctrine, 
93 MARQ. L. REV. 1121, 1121 (2010) (commenting that a manufacturer can be 
sued in tort if its “defective product causes personal injury”). 
 47.  MINN. STAT. § 604.101, subdiv. 2 (providing that the economic loss 
doctrine “does not apply to claims for injury to the person”); 80 S. Eighth St. L.P. 
v. Carey-Can., Inc., 486 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn.) (“[E]conomic losses that arise 
out of commercial transactions, except those involving personal injury . . . are not 
recoverable under the tort theories of negligence or strict products liability.” 
(quoting Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159, 162 
(Minn. 1981))), amended by 492 N.W.2d 256 (Minn. 1992); Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 
458 N.W.2d 683, 688 (“[T]here is reason . . . to preserve tort remedies for personal 
injuries arising out of commercial transactions, as well as those arising out of 
consumer transactions . . . .”); see also D & A Dev. Co. v. Butler, 357 N.W.2d 
156, 159 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (citing Minneapolis Soc’y of Fine Arts v. Parker-
Klein Assocs. Architects, Inc., 354 N.W.2d 816, 819–20 (Minn. 1984)) (noting that 
the economic loss doctrine in “Minnesota does allow the recovery of economic 
damages when they accompany personal injury”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
7
Kieselbach: Torts: An Alternative Approach to Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013
 
2013] AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO GLORVIGEN 231 
First, courts and legislatures have determined that “[s]ocial 
interests in health and safety may outweigh the commercial 
interests” of certainty and predictability.48 When a consumer 
purchases a product in the market, it may be fair to hold that he or 
she has assumed the risk of economic loss; however, “[a] consumer 
should not be charged at the will of the manufacturer with bearing 
the risk of physical injury.”49 If manufacturers could contractually 
disclaim liability for physical injuries without any possibility of 
liability in tort, the marketplace would be flooded with dangerous 
products. Holding manufacturers accountable for physical injuries 
provides a substantial incentive for the creation of products that 
are reasonably safe.50 Manufacturers are in the best position to 
assume this burden because they control product design, the 
 
PRODS. LIAB. § 21 cmt. c (1998); Brunmeier, supra note 37, at 872 (“The economic 
loss doctrine generally permits recovery only in contract for ‘economic losses’ 
arising from defective products, while both contract and tort recovery are available 
for ‘noneconomic losses.’”). 
 48.  Sylvester, supra note 37, at 422; see also Lloyd F. Smith Co., v. Den-Tal-Ez, 
Inc., 491 N.W.2d 11, 16 (Minn. 1992) (“[W]hen the defective product causes 
personal injury, an injury which may occur many years after the sale, the law’s 
concern for compensating personal injury outweighs the commercial need for a 
relatively short limitation period and traditional tort remedies are permitted.”); 
Superwood Corp., 311 N.W.2d at 162 (“Limiting the application of strict products 
liability to consumers’ actions or actions involving personal injury will allow the 
UCC to satisfy the needs of the commercial sector and still protect the legitimate 
expectations of consumers.”), overruled by Hapka, 458 N.W.2d at 688 (Minn. 1990); 
Mike Steenson, The Character of the Minnesota Tort System, 33 WM. MITCHELL 
L. REV. 239, 255–56 (2006) (“The economic loss doctrine . . . balances two 
conflicting societal goals. One encourages marketplace efficiency through the 
voluntary allocation of economic risks, and the other discourages conduct that 
leads to physical harm.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 49.  Sylvester, supra note 37, at 420 (quoting Seely v. White Motor Co., 
403 P.2d 145, 151 (Cal. 1965)). As California Supreme Court Justice Traynor wrote 
in his oft-cited concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno: 
[P]ublic policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will 
most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in 
defective products that reach the market. It is evident that the 
manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and guard against the 
recurrence of others, as the public cannot. Those who suffer injury 
from defective products are unprepared to meet its consequences. The 
cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an 
overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, 
for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and 
distributed among the public as a cost of doing business. 
150 P.2d 436, 440–41 (Cal. 1944). 
 50.  Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 290 Minn. 321, 328, 
188 N.W.2d 426, 431 (1971) (“[M]aximum legal protection should be afforded 
the consumer to promote product safety . . . .”).  
8
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manufacturing process, warnings, and instructions, and they can 
pass the cost on to consumers.51 Without the personal injury 
exception to the economic loss doctrine, the risk of injury and all 
associated burdens would be placed solely on the shoulders of 
individual consumers. 
A second policy consideration is that consumers often lack 
bargaining power relative to manufacturers. The reason for this 
disparity is twofold. First, manufacturers have greater financial 
resources than individual consumers. Second, most products are 
delivered to the marketplace in take-it or leave-it form. Consumers 
“have little opportunity to inspect a product for potential hazards”52 
or to make suggestions for improvements to the manufacturer.53 
Because of this, consumers are generally unable to “protect 
themselves by contractually shifting the risk of loss.”54 The personal 
injury exception levels the playing field by automatically allocating 
liability onto manufacturers. 
A third and final policy consideration underlying the 
exception is that contract damages are usually inappropriate for 
claims involving personal injury.55 Under the rules of tort, a 
plaintiff can liberally recover consequential damages,56 damages for 
mental suffering and emotional distress,57 and punitive damages.58 
 
 51.  Id. (“[T]he burden of loss caused by placing a defective product on the 
market should be borne by the manufacturer, who is best able to distribute it by 
insuring against inevitable hazards as a part of the cost of the product . . . .”); 
Duxbury v. Spex Feeds, Inc., 681 N.W.2d 380, 387 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) 
(commenting that it is appropriate to “impose the costs of defective products 
upon the maker, who presumably profits from the product” (quoting In re 
Shigellosis Litig., 647 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002))). 
 52.  Sylvester, supra note 37, at 422. 
 53.  Id. (commenting that if a consumer noticed something that “he or she 
thought would make the product safer, the manufacturer would be unlikely to 
respond”). 
 54.  Id.; see also Lee, 290 Minn. at 327–28, 188 N.W.2d at 431 (“The public 
interest in safety will be promoted by discouraging the marketing of defective 
products which constitute a menace to consumers not equipped to protect 
themselves from products they are induced to purchase through modern 
advertising methods by persuasive representations that the product is suitable and 
safe for its intended use.”). 
 55.  See Michael Dorff, Attaching Tort Claims to Contract Actions: An Economic 
Analysis of Contort, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 390, 398–401 (1997).  
 56.  Id. at 398 (“Tort victims are generally denied consequential damages only 
if ‘there was nothing in the situation to suggest to the most cautious mind’ that the 
consequence would occur.” (quoting Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 
101 (N.Y. 1928))).  
 57.  See Dornfeld v. Oberg, 503 N.W.2d 115, 118 (Minn. 1993) (“Minnesota 
has allowed recovery for injuries resulting from fear for one’s own safety.”). 
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Contract damages, on the other hand, are significantly more 
limited.59 Consequential damages for breach of contract are only 
awarded if they were reasonably “in contemplation of both parties, 
at the time they made the contract, as a probable result of the 
breach of it.”60 This is a very high standard.61 Furthermore, damages 
for mental suffering and emotional distress are almost never 
permitted “except in exceptional cases where the breach [of the 
contract] is accompanied by an independent tort.”62 Punitive 
damages, meanwhile, are similarly almost never permitted.63 If the 
economic loss doctrine barred tort claims for contract breaches 
that resulted in personal injury, injured parties would consistently 
be deprived of adequate compensation. 
In summary, the economic loss doctrine prohibits tort claims 
when the breach of a contract results in pure economic loss. 
For public policy reasons, however, the doctrine’s tort prohibition 
has not been interpreted to extend to claims involving personal 
injury. 
C. Educational Malpractice Doctrine 
The educational malpractice doctrine, as a matter of law, bars 
“claims that attack the general quality of education provided to 
students.”64 Although a teacher or school may be liable for 
 
 58.  See MINN. STAT. § 549.20 (2012) (outlining when punitive damages are 
permitted in civil actions). 
 59.  Dorff, supra note 55, at 398 (“[T]he foreseeability rule is applied more 
loosely in tort than in contract.”). 
 60.  Id. (quoting Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch.)). 
 61.  Cf. id. at 406 (“[T]he foreseeability test is applied more loosely in tort 
than in contract. In tort, the foreseeability test is applied from the time of the 
injury, looking backwards. In contract, the focus is on the time the agreement was 
made; defendants are only liable for consequential damages within the 
contemplation of the parties at the time of contract formation. Because the focus 
in tort is closer in time, consequential damages are generally more foreseeable 
than in contract cases.”). 
 62.  Deli v. Univ. of Minn., 578 N.W.2d 779, 782 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998); 
see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 (1981). 
 63.  See Jacobs v. Farmland Mut. Ins. Co., 377 N.W.2d 441, 445 (Minn. 1985) 
(“Even if a contract is breached maliciously, punitive damages will not lie unless 
the maliciousness constitutes an independent tort.”); Barr/Nelson, Inc. v. Tonto’s, 
Inc., 336 N.W.2d 46, 52 (Minn. 1983) (holding that punitive damages are not 
allowed except “where the breach is accompanied by an independent tort”). 
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1981). 
 64.  Alsides v. Brown Inst., Ltd., 592 N.W.2d 468, 472 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999). 
See generally DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 333 (2d ed. 2011) (providing a general survey of the educational 
10
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negligent supervision,65 or for maintaining defective premises or 
equipment,66 the educational malpractice doctrine provides that 
there is no commensurate liability for failing to effectively 
educate.67 
Educational malpractice was first tested, and rejected, as a 
cause of action in 1976 in Peter W. v. San Francisco United School 
District.68 In this seminal case, a recent high school graduate sued 
his local school district alleging that the district’s negligence caused 
him to fall short of basic academic benchmarks in reading and 
writing.69 The California Court of Appeals dismissed the plaintiff’s 
claim, concluding that “the failure of educational achievement may 
not be characterized as an ‘injury’ within the meaning of tort law.”70 
The court reached this conclusion on two grounds. First, the court 
pointed out that there is “no readily acceptable standard[] of care” 
for an educator because of the wide, and often conflicting, range of 
viewpoints on pedagogy and teaching methodology.71 Second, the 
court noted that there are too many factors “outside the formal 
teaching process, and beyond the control of its ministers” that 
affect a student’s academic achievement, making causation tenuous 
at best.72 
In the wake of Peter W., the educational malpractice doctrine 
was adopted by many other jurisdictions nationwide.73 In the 
 
malpractice doctrine). 
 65.  E.g., Sheehan v. St. Peter’s Catholic Sch., 291 Minn. 1, 2, 188 N.W.2d 868, 
869 (1971). 
 66.  E.g., Tiemann v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 740, 331 N.W.2d 250, 251 
(Minn. 1983); Kingsley v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 2, 312 Minn. 572, 574, 251 N.W.2d 
634, 635 (1977). 
 67.  There are three basic types of educational malpractice claims: “(1) the 
student alleges that the school negligently failed to provide him with adequate 
skills; (2) the student alleges that the school negligently diagnosed or failed to 
diagnose his learning or mental disabilities; or (3) the student alleges that the 
school negligently supervised his training.” Dall. Airmotive, Inc. v. FlightSafety 
Int’l, Inc., 277 S.W.3d 696, 699 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Moore v. Vanderloo, 
386 N.W.2d 108, 113 (Iowa 1986)). 
 68.  131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (Ct. App. 1976). 
 69.  Id. at 856. 
 70.  Id. at 862. 
 71.  Id. at 860. 
 72.  Id. at 861. 
 73.  See, e.g., Christensen v. S. Normal Sch., 790 So. 2d 252, 254–55 
(Ala. 2001) (“Alabama does not recognize a cause of action for educational 
malpractice.”); Page v. Klein Tools, Inc., 610 N.W.2d 900, 906 (Mich. 2000) 
(“[C]laims alleging negligent instruction, whether those claims are brought 
against public schools, institutions of higher learning, or private proprietary and 
11
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beginning, the rule was applied primarily to “traditional classroom 
schools.”74 Over time, however, it was extended to include “other 
educational experiences, like residency training for physicians and 
surgeons or trade or technical schools.”75 Presently, nearly all 
jurisdictions that have “considered the issue[] [have] found that 
educational malpractice claims are not cognizable.”76 
In Minnesota, educational malpractice was first considered in 
1999 in Alsides v. Brown Institute, Ltd.77 There, a group of students 
sued Brown Institute, a for-profit trade school, alleging, among 
other things, that courses were ineffectively taught.78 In rejecting 
the plaintiffs’ claim, the court of appeals cited precedent from 
other jurisdictions and concluded that educational malpractice is 
not a viable cause of action.79 The court focused on public policy 
arguments, noting that it would be too difficult to establish an 
acceptable “standard of care by which to evaluate an educator” and 
to prove causation.80 Furthermore, recognition of educational 
malpractice would “embroil the courts into overseeing the day-to-
day operations of schools” and expose educators to a “flood of 
litigation.”81 Since Alsides, Minnesota courts have continued to 
recognize and apply the educational malpractice doctrine.82 
However, it has never been expressly considered by the supreme 
court. 
 
trade schools, are not cognizable in Michigan.”); Andre v. Pace Univ., 655 N.Y.S.2d 
777, 779 (App. Term 1996) (“[T]he courts of this State have consistently declined 
to entertain actions sounding in ‘educational malpractice.’”); Lawrence v. Lorain 
Cnty. Cmty. Coll., 713 N.E.2d 478, 480 (Ohio 1998) (“Ohio does not recognize 
educational malpractice claims for public policy reasons.”). 
 74.  DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 64, § 333. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Dall. Airmotive, Inc. v. FlightSafety Int’l, Inc., 277 S.W.3d 696, 699 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2008). But see B.M. by Burger v. State, 649 P.2d 425, 427 (Mont. 1982) 
(“The school authorities owed [a] child a duty of reasonable care in testing her 
and placing her in an appropriate special education program.”).  
 77.  592 N.W.2d 468, 472 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (“The question of whether 
courts should recognize a claim for educational malpractice is one of first 
impression in Minnesota.”). 
 78.  Id. at 470–71. 
 79.  Id. at 473. 
 80.  Id. at 472. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  See, e.g., Zinter v. Univ. of Minn., 799 N.W.2d 243 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011); 
Clem v. St. Mary’s Univ. of Minn., No. A09-1231, 2010 WL 773596 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Mar. 9, 2010); Smith v. Argosy Educ. Grp., Inc., No. A08-0222, 2008 WL 4977598 
(Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2008). 
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III. THE GLORVIGEN V. CIRRUS DESIGN CORP. DECISION 
A. Facts and Procedure 
On January 18, 2003, Gary R. Prokop and James Kosak were 
killed in an airplane crash.83 Mr. Prokop was piloting an SR22, 
which he had purchased from Cirrus—the manufacturer—in 
December 2002.84 As a part of the purchase price, Cirrus 
committed to provide Mr. Prokop with transition training to help 
him become familiar with the airplane.85 Providing training to a 
new owner is a standard practice within the general aviation 
industry.86 Cirrus contracted with the University of North Dakota 
Aerospace Foundation (UNDAF) to run the program.87 
Mr. Prokop began transition training on December 9, 2002.88 
The program consisted of corresponding ground and in-flight 
lessons.89 The UNDAF training instructor was required to complete 
a syllabus assessing Mr. Prokop’s mastery of all lessons taught.90 A 
key part of the training was Flight Lesson 4a, which involved an 
emergency maneuver known as “Recovery from VFR91 into IMC92 
(auto-pilot assisted).”93 This maneuver allows a pilot, with the help 
of the autopilot function, to recover safely after inadvertently flying 
into an area of low visibility.94 Flight Lesson 4a was particularly 
important to Mr. Prokop because he was only licensed to fly in 
high-visibility conditions,95 and he did not have prior experience 
using an autopilot function.96 
 
 83.  Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., 816 N.W.2d 572, 579 (Minn. 2012). 
 84.  Id. at 575. 
 85.  Id. at 576. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. at 578. 
 89.  Id. at 576–77. 
 90.  Id. at 578. 
 91.  VFR stands for “visual flight rule.” Id. at 577. “VFR conditions are weather 
conditions in which visibility is three miles or greater and the pilot is able to see 
the ground.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 92.  IMC stands for “instrument meteorological conditions.” Id. “In IMC, a 
pilot is deprived of visual ground references and must rely on instruments to fly 
the airplane.” Id. 
 93.  Id. at 577–78. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. at 577. 
 96.  Id. at 575–76. Mr. Prokop’s previous airplane was a 1968 Cessna 172 Sky 
Hawk. Id. at 575. 
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Although Mr. Prokop completed the training program, he 
never received the in-flight portion of Flight Lesson 4a as 
promised.97 According to the syllabus, this part of the lesson was 
omitted.98 Mr. Prokop’s only exposure to the emergency maneuver 
came from a PowerPoint presentation that he watched during a 
ground lesson and from several written training manuals provided 
by Cirrus.99 He never had the opportunity to practice the maneuver 
in the air. 
Several weeks later, on January 18, 2003, Mr. Prokop and 
passenger Mr. Kosak embarked on a flight from Grand Rapids to 
St. Cloud.100 Shortly after departing, they experienced turbulence.101 
As Mr. Prokop attempted to deal with the turbulence, the airplane 
entered low-visibility conditions.102 This resulted in an emergency 
situation identical to the one that was supposed to be covered in 
Flight Lesson 4a.103 Mr. Prokop, for reasons unknown, failed to 
engage the autopilot and did not attempt to perform the Recovery 
from VFR into IMC maneuver.104 Shortly thereafter, the airplane 
entered into an accelerated stall and crashed into the ground.105 
Both Mr. Prokop and Mr. Kosak were killed on impact.106 
After the accident, Thomas Gartland, as trustee for the next of 
kin of Mr. Prokop, and Rick Glorvigen, as trustee for the next of 
kin of Mr. Kosak, commenced negligence actions against Cirrus.107 
The plaintiffs alleged that Cirrus breached its duty to warn by 
failing to provide adequate training.108 Specifically, the plaintiffs 
argued that if Mr. Prokop had received the promised in-flight 
 
 97.  Id. at 578. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. at 577. 
 100.  Id. at 578. 
 101.  Id. at 579. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. at 578–79. 
 104.  See id. at 579. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Complaint, Gartland v. Cirrus Design Corp., No. 31-CV-05-3673 (Minn. 
Dist. Ct. Sept. 13, 2005), 2005 WL 6309346 [hereinafter Gartland Complaint]; 
Complaint, Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., No. 31-CV-05-3673 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 
July 28, 2005), 2005 WL 6309684 [hereinafter Glorvigen Complaint]. The district 
court combined the two cases. Glorvigen, 816 N.W.2d at 575. UNDAF intervened as 
a party after Cirrus sought indemnity. Id. at 580.  
 108.  Gartland Complaint, supra note 107, ¶ 5; Glorvigen Complaint, supra 
note 107, ¶¶ 18–20. 
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training, he would have engaged the autopilot, performed the 
Recovery from VFR into IMC maneuver, and stabilized the 
aircraft.109 Because the crash was a foreseeable result of this 
deficient training, Cirrus had a duty to provide the omitted in-flight 
lesson.110 
After weighing the evidence, the trial court ultimately found in 
favor of the plaintiffs and awarded nearly $20,000,000 in 
damages.111 Cirrus and UNDAF appealed112 and a divided court of 
appeals overturned the verdict.113 The court concluded that Cirrus’s 
duty to warn “did not include the provision of transition 
training.”114 Citing Alsides,115 the court also concluded that Cirrus 
did not voluntarily assume a duty to train when it offered transition 
training because “Minnesota does not recognize the duty to 
effectively educate.”116 Such a claim, the court noted, is “barred 
under the educational-malpractice doctrine.”117 Mr. Glorvigen and 
Mr. Gartland appealed and the Minnesota Supreme Court granted 
review.118 
B. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Holding 
In 2012, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the decision 
of the court of appeals, but utilized different reasoning.119 The 
court echoed the lower court in holding that the duty to warn does 
not include a duty to train.120 The supreme court reasoned that the 
imposition of a duty to train would extend the duty to warn to 
unacceptable lengths, representing “an unprecedented expansion 
of the law.”121 The majority wrote: “While we agree that 
foreseeability guides our determination of whether a duty to warn 
 
 109.  See Glorvigen, 816 N.W.2d at 578. 
 110.  Gartland Complaint, supra note 107, ¶ 5; Glorvigen Complaint, supra 
note 107, ¶¶ 9–10, 17. 
 111.  Glorvigen, 816 N.W.2d at 580. 
 112.  Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., 796 N.W.2d 541, 543 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2011), aff’d, 816 N.W.2d 572 (Minn. 2012).  
 113.  Id. at 558. 
 114.  Id. at 552. 
 115.  Alsides v. Brown Inst., Ltd., 592 N.W.2d 468, 473 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999). 
 116.  Glorvigen, 796 N.W.2d at 556. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., 816 N.W.2d 572, 580 (Minn. 2012). 
 119.  Id. at 584. 
 120.  Id. at 583. 
 121.  Id. 
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exists, we do not agree that foreseeability leads to a conclusion that 
Cirrus’s duty to warn included an obligation to provide training.”122 
In deciding whether or not Cirrus voluntarily assumed a duty 
to train, however, the court declined to consider the educational 
malpractice doctrine.123 Instead, the court indirectly invoked the 
economic loss doctrine and concluded that “[w]hen a contract 
provides the only source of duties between the parties, Minnesota 
law does not permit the breach of those duties to support a cause 
of action in negligence.”124 In other words, the breach of a contract 
duty alone cannot give rise to liability in tort. Under this 
framework, the court reasoned that Cirrus did not assume a duty to 
train because its obligation was created only by the purchase 
agreement.125 
The court’s decision in Glorvigen was not unanimous. The 
dissent, penned by Justice Paul Anderson and joined by Justice 
Page, rejected both portions of the majority’s holding. The dissent 
first argued that the question of training should be left to a jury.126 
In other words, a jury should determine, as a matter of adequacy, 
whether a written warning was sufficient or whether additional 
training was required.127 Second, the dissent argued that the 
purchase agreement should not have shielded Cirrus from 
assuming a duty to train.128 To justify this position, the dissent noted 
that the appellants’ claims fit squarely within the personal injury 
exception to the economic loss doctrine.129  
Overall, the dissent cautioned that the court’s decision and 
reasoning would have “far-reaching consequences.”130 As Justice 
Anderson explained: 
By holding that a supplier of a dangerous product . . . is 
never required to provide anything beyond written 
 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. at 584. 
 124.  Id. (quoting United States v. Johnson, 853 F.2d 619, 622 (8th Cir. 1988)). 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. at 585–87 (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
 127.  Id. The dissent pointed out that “[t]he jury’s determination will vary 
from case to case, based on the facts of the case and the type of product the 
supplier provides.” Id. at 586. 
 128.  Id. at 587. 
 129.  See id. at 589 (“While we have rightly limited tort liability when the 
relationship of the parties is governed purely by contract, we have never 
foreclosed—indeed, we have specifically accommodated—tort liability when 
personal injury or non-economic-loss damages are asserted.”). 
 130.  Id. 
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instructions—even if the supplier has promised to provide 
nonwritten instructions—the majority has essentially held 
that no consumer of a dangerous product may ever hold a 
supplier liable for personal injury arising out of defective 
nonwritten instructions.131 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The Minnesota Supreme Court reached the right conclusion 
in Glorvigen, but its approach was inconsistent. The majority 
correctly decided (1) that the duty to warn does not include the 
duty to train,132 and (2) that Cirrus did not voluntarily assume a 
duty to train.133 However, in addressing the assumed-duty issue, the 
court erred by holding—in essence—that the breach of the 
contract could not lead to liability in tort.134 This holding was 
unnecessary and does not comport with Minnesota precedent 
regarding the economic loss doctrine.135 To avoid this outcome, the 
court should have adopted the reasoning of the court of appeals 
and applied the educational malpractice doctrine. 
A. Rejection of a Duty to Train: The Right Result 
The court’s decision to reject an independent duty to train was 
proper and is consistent with holdings from other jurisdictions.136 
 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 133.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 134.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 135.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 136.  See Woodhouse v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S. L.L.C., No. EP-11-CV-113-PRM, 
2011 WL 3666595, at *3 (W.D. Tex. June 23, 2011) (stating that a prescription 
drug manufacturer had no duty to train a prescribing doctor); Adeyinka v. Yankee 
Fiber Control, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 2d 265, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting that no duty 
to train “appears to exist under New York law”); Lemon v. Anonymous Physician, 
No. 1:04CV2083LJMWTL, 2005 WL 2218359, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 12, 2005) 
(“A medical device manufacturer does not automatically have a duty to properly 
train . . . a physician on the surgical implantation and use of the device.”); 
York v. Union Carbide Corp., 586 N.E.2d 861, 870 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (holding 
that there is “no authority for the proposition that a manufacturer has a legal duty 
to train the employees of its buyers”); Chamian v. Sharplan Lasers, Inc., 
No. 200000171, 2004 WL 2341569, at *7 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 24, 2004) (holding 
that a medical device manufacturer, “[b]y providing training . . . did not become a 
guarantor of . . . competence”). See generally Jennifer A. Eppensteiner & Regina M. 
Nelson, “Failure to Train” and Medical Device Misuse Claims, FOR DEF., Apr. 2013, 
at 31, 31–34 (discussing recent cases involving medical device and prescription 
drug manufacturers where the duty to train has been rejected). 
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As the supreme court noted, appellants did not cite any “case—
from any court—in which the supplier or manufacturer was 
obligated to provide training in order to discharge its duty to 
warn.”137 In fact, acceptance of the appellants’ claims would require 
either the creation of “a new common law duty to train or [an] 
expan[sion of] the duty to warn to include training.”138 For the 
reasons discussed below, these are not desirable options. 
Imposing a duty to train would place an undue burden on 
manufacturers, both in terms of cost and exposure to liability. 
Manufacturers already have a duty to warn of reasonably 
foreseeable dangers.139 A supplemental duty to train could, in some 
instances, make manufacturers both guarantors of absolute 
product safety and insurers for injured consumers.140 This would 
not be a just result. Manufacturers cannot be solely responsible for 
user competency. Some of this burden should fall upon the 
consumer, who ultimately chooses whether or not to purchase a 
dangerous product.141 
A duty to train would also have a negative impact on the 
marketplace. Manufacturers may elect not to produce important 
but dangerous products, to the detriment of society.142 The cost of 
providing training and litigating claims would be passed to 
consumers, resulting in higher prices.143 Manufacturers may decide 
 
 137.  Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., 816 N.W.2d 572, 583 (Minn. 2012). 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  E.g., Gray v. Badger Mining Corp., 676 N.W.2d 268, 274 (Minn. 2004). 
 140.  See Brief and Addendum of Respondent Cirrus Design Corp. at 35, 
Glorvigen, 816 N.W.2d 572 (Nos. A10-1242, -1243, -1246, -1247), 2011 WL 9518487 
(“Because the nature of flying means that almost any task a pilot undertakes could 
‘foreseeably’ cause a crash if improperly performed, the duty Plaintiffs urge here 
would effectively make an aircraft manufacturer the guarantor of the overall 
competence of any pilot who buys its plane.”); Brief and Appendix of Amicus 
Curiae Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc. at 7, Glorvigen, 
816 N.W.2d 572 (Nos. A10-1242, -1243, -1246, -1247), 2011 WL 9518489 (arguing 
that a duty to train would unreasonably require manufacturers to “insure not only 
that consumers are warned about product dangers and provided instructions 
regarding safe product use, but also insure through supplemental training that 
consumers implement these warnings and instructions in an applied setting”). 
 141.  See Brief and Appendix of Amicus Curiae Product Liability Advisory 
Council, Inc., supra note 140, at 8 (“There is a line between the duty to 
warn/provide instructions and the duty to learn. The former duty rests with the 
product manufacturer or seller. The latter duty belongs to the product user.”). 
 142.  Id. at 16. 
 143.  Id. at 17. 
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to stop selling their products in Minnesota to avoid potential 
liability and the burden of providing training.144 
If a consumer, after being warned and instructed on how to 
safely use a product, continues to desire actual training, he or she 
should be permitted to bargain with the manufacturer to receive 
this training. But, training should not be imposed as a blanket tort 
duty. A blanket duty would interfere with the freedom to contract, 
as not all consumers will want training.145 If a duty to train is ever 
imposed, it should be industry specific and it should be regulated 
by the legislature or administrative agencies. Courts and juries 
simply do not have the necessary experience, expertise, or 
authority to determine when training is needed or whether training 
is effective.146 Instead, manufacturers, consumers, agencies, and 
lawmakers should be afforded the opportunity to work together to 
develop training protocols that are sensible and equitable.147 
The strongest, although still failing, argument in favor of a 
duty to train is that the provision of training should be a question 
of adequacy for a jury.148 As Justice Anderson explained in his 
dissent, “once the state district court determined that Cirrus owed a 
duty to warn, it was up to the jury—not the court, and certainly not 
our court—to determine whether Cirrus provided an adequate 
 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  It is a well-established rule that if a manufacturer offers an optional safety 
device and a consumer declines to purchase it, the manufacturer is not relieved of 
liability for subsequent injuries. See Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 624–25 
(Minn. 1984). This rule is based on the principle that a manufacturer cannot 
“delegate its duty to design a reasonably safe product.” Id. at 624. Because product 
safety is a non-delegable duty, it stands to reason that manufacturers would be 
prohibited from delegating training options to consumers. The consequence of 
this is that consumers would likely lose the ability to make their own choices 
regarding training. 
 146.  It is fundamental that the power to create laws and regulations resides 
solely with the legislative branch. See Smith v. Holm, 220 Minn. 486, 489, 
19 N.W.2d 914, 915 (1945) (“[T]he initiative in legislation lies entirely in the 
legislature . . . .”). 
 147.  This type of cooperation already occurs within the aviation industry. The 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), for example, has enacted specific rules 
governing individual pilot and flight school certification. See 14 C.F.R. § 61 (2013). 
The FAA has also established specific airplane manufacturing standards. 
See id. § 23. 
 148.  Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., 816 N.W.2d 572, 587 (Minn. 2012) 
(Anderson, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority mistook whether Cirrus owed a duty to 
warn, which was for court resolution, for the question [of] whether Cirrus 
adequately discharged its duty to warn, which was for jury resolution.”). 
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warning or whether Cirrus breached its duty to warn.”149 This line 
of reasoning, however, does not align with Minnesota precedent. 
First, making training a jury question would implicate many of 
the concerns associated with the educational malpractice 
doctrine.150 Second, the Minnesota Supreme Court has succinctly 
defined what constitutes a legally adequate warning,151 and Cirrus 
met this threshold by providing written instructions that 
(1) attracted Mr. Prokop’s attention, (2) detailed the risks of 
inadvertently entering into IMC, and (3) explained how to recover 
using the autopilot.152 Because legal adequacy was achieved short of 
providing training, there was no basis to conclude that Cirrus had a 
duty to train.153 
Overall, the court’s decision to reject an independent duty to 
train was the correct one. Enlarging the duty to warn to include 
training would place too great of a burden on manufacturers. 
This would hamper economic activity in Minnesota and interfere 
with the freedom to contract. Furthermore, a duty to train would 
place the court system into a supervisory role that is best occupied 
by legislatures and agencies. The duty to warn is an appropriate 
middle ground that protects both manufacturers and consumers. 
There is no compelling reason to disturb this balance. 
B. Rejection of an Assumed Duty to Train: The Right Outcome but an 
Inconsistent Approach 
The Glorvigen court was also correct to conclude that Cirrus 
did not assume a duty to train by undertaking to provide transition 
training. Ordinarily, it should be noted, a party can assume a duty 
 
 149.  Id. at 585. 
 150.  For example, how can a jury be tasked with assessing training if there is 
no duty to effectively educate? What is the appropriate standard of care for a flight 
school? How does a party prove causation?  
 151.  See supra text accompanying note 33.  
 152.  Glorvigen, 816 N.W.2d at 583.  
 153.  See id. There is a counterargument to be made that the court’s reasoning 
is circular. The court created the standard for evaluating a warning’s adequacy 
and is now using this standard to justify its present rejection of a duty to train. 
Although this counterargument is true in part, it does not undermine the court’s 
decision. One of the supreme court’s main roles is to “help develop, clarify or 
harmonize the law.” MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 117, subdiv. 2(d). The court 
accomplished this purpose when it determined what constitutes a legally adequate 
warning. The criteria have helped lower courts adjudicate failure to warn claims 
with greater consistency and uniformity. Here, the Glorvigen court simply adhered 
to its own precedent, which it was justified in creating.  
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of reasonable care by voluntarily undertaking to act.154 However, 
the impact of holding that a manufacturer can assume a duty to 
train would have unacceptable consequences for society. On policy 
grounds alone, the court’s decision was the right one. 
Training is often provided to consumers in a wide range of 
industries, either for free or as a part of the purchase price of a 
product. It is offered to create good will and to promote product 
safety. Very often, it achieves both of these ends.155 Nonetheless, if 
providing training constituted an assumption of duty in tort, most 
manufacturers would likely stop offering training altogether. The 
risk of liability would have a chilling effect. Illogically, 
manufacturers that continued to offer training would be penalized 
for their socially responsible behavior. Without available training, 
public health and safety would suffer. A doctor, for obvious 
reasons, should not be expected to learn how to use a new medical 
device simply by reading an instruction manual. Based on such an 
example, it is clear that the law should encourage, not discourage, 
the provision of voluntary training. 
The court’s approach to rejecting an assumed duty to train, 
however, was inconsistent at best. While the economic loss doctrine 
clearly prohibits tort claims for pure economic loss, it has never 
been interpreted to extend to cases that, as here, involve personal 
injury.156 The justification for this distinction, as discussed earlier, is 
that manufacturers have a stand-alone duty, irrespective of any 
contract, to avoid conduct that may cause physical injury.157 This 
duty, which is a foundation of products liability law, is based on the 
principle that public health and safety prevail over contractual 
interests of uniformity and marketplace efficiency, particularly 
 
 154.  See Isler v. Burman, 305 Minn. 288, 295, 232 N.W.2d 818, 822 (1975) 
(“It is well established that one who voluntarily assumes a duty must exercise 
reasonable care or he will be responsible for damages resulting from his failure to 
do so.”). 
 155.  Harley-Davidson, for example, offers its customers the opportunity to 
enroll in a “Rider’s Edge” training course. For a description of this course and all 
other Harley-Davidson training programs, see Learn to Ride, HARLEY-DAVIDSON, 
http://www.harley-davidson.com/en_US/Content/Pages/learn-to-ride/learn-to 
-ride.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2013). 
 156.  See supra notes 46–63 and accompanying text. 
 157.  Cf. 80 S. Eighth St. Ltd. P’ship v. Carey-Can., Inc., 486 N.W.2d 393, 396 
(Minn.) (“The economic loss doctrine provides a balance between two conflicting 
societal goals: that of encouraging marketplace efficiency through the voluntary 
contractual allocation of economic risks with that of discouraging conduct that 
leads to physical harm.”), amended by 492 N.W.2d 256 (Minn. 1992). 
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when there is a disparity of bargaining power between the parties.158 
It is also founded on the notion that “contract damages are 
generally inadequate and ill-suited for personal injury claims.”159 
The majority seemingly ignored this precedent by holding that 
“Cirrus did not assume a duty to provide Flight Lesson 4a outside 
of its contract with [Mr.] Prokop . . . .”160 Cirrus undertook to train 
Mr. Prokop on how to fly the SR22, but failed to provide all of the 
training that it promised.161 This breach reputedly resulted in 
appellants’ death,162 which is the most severe form of personal 
injury. The appellants were not seeking remediation for pure 
economic loss, such as damage to the airplane. Furthermore, the 
case implicates all of the relevant public policy considerations that 
have been used to justify the personal injury exception. Pilot and 
passenger safety unquestionably outweigh any aviation marketplace 
considerations. Additionally, there was a substantial disparity in 
bargaining power between Cirrus and Mr. Prokop. Cirrus is a 
multinational corporation with intimate knowledge of the SR22.163 
Mr. Prokop, conversely, was a relatively new pilot with no 
experience using an autopilot. Lastly, contract damages are plainly 
inadequate for claims involving the untimely deaths of two 
husbands and fathers. Based on the foregoing, the contract should 
not have been treated as a bar to appellants’ tort claims. 
The supreme court’s reasoning to the contrary raises 
significant questions for the future of tort law in Minnesota. 
Minnesota courts have consistently held that a party can assume a 
duty in tort even where “there [was] no duty in the first instance.”164 
The existence of a contract should not alter this principle when the 
claim involves personal injury. As Justice Paul Anderson argued in 
his dissent: 
If the mere presence of a contract foreclosed all tort 
liability, medical malpractice claims would cease to exist. 
 
 158.  See supra notes 46–63 and accompanying text. 
 159.  Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., 816 N.W.2d 572, 589 (Minn. 2012) 
(Anderson, J., dissenting). 
 160.  Id. at 584 (majority opinion). 
 161.  Id. at 577–78. 
 162.  Gartland Complaint, supra note 107, ¶¶ 3–10; Glorvigen Complaint, 
supra note 107, ¶¶ 19–20. 
 163.  As the manufacturer, Cirrus was unquestionably in a better position to 
foresee the potential dangers and risks of operating the SR22. 
 164.  Williams v. Harris, 518 N.W.2d 864, 868 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994); see, e.g., 
Isler v. Burman, 305 Minn. 288, 295, 232 N.W.2d 818, 821–22 (1975). 
22
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol40/iss1/7
 
246 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1 
A passenger injured in a car accident while riding in a taxi 
cab would have only a breach of contract claim against the 
cab driver and cab company. A paid babysitter who failed 
to prevent injury to a child would be liable only in 
contract. The list goes on.165 
Although Justice Anderson’s examples are extreme, he makes 
a cogent point. A defendant should not be “‘immunize[d] . . . from 
tort liability for his wrongful acts,’ just because those acts ‘grow out 
of’ or are ‘coincident’ to a contract.”166 Yet by rejecting that Cirrus 
assumed a duty to train because of the contract, the court appears, 
whether intentionally or not, to have adopted this position. 
C. An Alternative Approach: The Educational Malpractice Doctrine 
To avoid this inconsistent result, the court could have, and 
should have, employed the educational malpractice doctrine. The 
facts were well suited for the application of this legal theory. 
Training is a form of education. If there is no duty to effectively 
educate,167 then it follows that there should be no duty to effectively 
train. As the court of appeals noted, assessing the effectiveness of 
the transition-training program “would involve an inquiry into the 
nuances of the educational process, which is exactly the type of 
determination that the educational-malpractice bar is meant to 
avoid.”168 
Further, the facts of Glorvigen trigger most of the relevant 
public policy concerns described in Alsides.169 Causation, for 
example, is speculative at best. Because the recovery maneuver was 
taught during a ground lesson,170 it is impossible to say whether 
additional in-flight instruction would have prevented the crash. 
Other factors also potentially played a role in the accident, 
including Mr. Prokop’s aptitude for flying and the turbulence. 
Allowance of a claim in this instance would make the Minnesota 
court system an overseer of flight training schools. Experts within 
the industry and field, not the judiciary, should make decisions 
 
 165.  Glorvigen, 816 N.W.2d at 589 (Anderson, J., dissenting).  
 166.  Id. (quoting Eads v. Marks, 249 P.2d 257, 260 (Cal. 1952)). 
 167.  See Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., 796 N.W.2d 541, 556 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2011) (citing Alsides v. Brown Inst., Ltd., 592 N.W.2d 468, 473 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1999)), aff’d, 816 N.W.2d 572 (Minn. 2012). 
 168.  Id. (citing Alsides, 592 N.W.2d at 473–74). 
 169.  See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text. 
 170.  Glorvigen, 816 N.W.2d at 577. 
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regarding curriculum and methods. Lastly, the flood of litigation 
resulting from a claim of this nature would be vast. Any recipient of 
training in any field thereafter injured would include, as a matter 
of course, a claim for educational malpractice. The door would also 
potentially be open to third-party claims.171 Would an injured 
passenger have a cause of action against the pilot’s flight school for 
deficient training? Would a car crash victim have a claim against a 
driving school? Would an injured patient be able to sue a medical 
school or an aggrieved client a law school? The examples are 
almost endless. 
On top of this, there is precedent from other jurisdictions to 
support the application of the educational malpractice doctrine to 
flight training. In Dallas Airmotive, Inc. v. FlightSafety International, 
Inc., for example, a Missouri pilot was killed in a crash shortly after 
completing a training program offered by the defendant.172 It was 
alleged that the defendant negligently caused the crash because its 
flight simulator was “unrealistic” and its “curriculum inadequately 
prepared the pilot” for flight.173 Invoking the educational 
malpractice doctrine, the court held that the plaintiff’s claim was 
not cognizable because it “attack[ed] the quality of the 
instruction.”174 In particular, the court noted that the claim 
implicated all of “the public policy reasons underlying the refusal 
to recognize a claim of educational malpractice,” including the 
speculativeness of causation and the preference for “schools, and 
their regulating, accrediting, and certifying agencies, not courts . . . 
to make curriculum decisions.”175 
In Waugh v. Morgan Stanley & Co.,176 the Illinois Appellate 
Court reached a similar conclusion on similar facts.177 There, the 
court held that neither a flight school nor an individual instructor 
could be held liable in tort where the gravamen of a wrongful 
 
 171.  Third party educational malpractice claims have been attempted and 
rejected in several other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Moss Rehab v. White, 692 A.2d 902, 
909 (Del. 1997) (“A third-party claim for educational malpractice against a driving 
school is not a cognizable common-law cause of action in Delaware.”); Moore v. 
Vanderloo, 386 N.W.2d 108, 114–15 (Iowa 1986) (holding that an injured patient 
could not maintain a cause of action against her doctor’s chiropractic college for 
educational malpractice).  
 172.  277 S.W.3d 696, 698 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008). 
 173.  Id. at 700–01 (quotation marks omitted). 
 174.  Id. at 701. 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  966 N.E.2d 540 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). 
 177.  Id. at 543–47. 
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death claim related to the “poor quality of the education or 
training.”178 The court concluded that claims attacking the quality 
of flight instruction “are claims of educational malpractice and are 
barred, therefore, as a matter of law.”179 
Utilizing the educational malpractice doctrine in Glorvigen 
would have achieved two important ends. First, the court could 
have avoided bringing into question the personal injury exception 
to the economic loss doctrine. The existence of a contract should 
not be treated as a shield to tort liability, particularly for claims 
involving personal injury. Second, the court could have definitively 
established that the educational malpractice doctrine is the law in 
Minnesota, providing clarity for future cases. 
D. Counterarguments to the Educational Malpractice Doctrine 
There are three main counterarguments to rebut the 
application of the educational malpractice doctrine in Glorvigen: 
(1) appellants’ claims did not actually challenge the quality of 
flight training but rather that a promised in-flight lesson was 
omitted,180 (2) Cirrus and UNDAF are not educational institutions 
and therefore their conduct does not fall within the purview of the 
doctrine,181 and (3) use of the doctrine in this context would 
insulate flight schools and other training programs from liability 
for negligent or wrongful conduct.182 These arguments, although 
facially persuasive, ultimately lack merit. 
First, as the court of appeals pointed out in Alsides, a claim for 
educational malpractice arises “[w]here the essence of the 
complaint is that the school failed to provide an effective 
education.”183 No matter how the appellants’ claims are packaged, 
their essence is that Mr. Prokop was inadequately trained to handle 
IMC-like conditions. Whether this was the result of an omitted 
lesson or deficient training is of little consequence, as either would 
require the court to assess the quality of the ground lesson that Mr. 
Prokop did receive, and to evaluate the reason for and the impact 
 
 178.  Id. at 554. 
 179.  Id. 
 180.  See infra notes 183–188 and accompanying text. 
 181.  See infra notes 189–190 and accompanying text. 
 182.  See infra notes 191–194 and accompanying text. 
 183.  Alsides v. Brown Inst., Ltd., 592 N.W.2d 468, 473 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) 
(quotation marks omitted). 
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of the “instructor’s failure to provide flight training.”184 This clearly 
sounds in educational malpractice. 
Furthermore, it is a fairly well-established principle that items 
listed in a curriculum or checklist do not automatically establish a 
standard of care in tort.185 In Larson v. Independent School District 
No. 314, Braham,186 for example, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
held that a school district’s curriculum, although relevant did not 
create “mandatory affirmative duties for teachers, principals, or 
superintendents.”187 In Canada v. McCarthy, the court similarly held 
that a contractor’s safety checklist did not “establish a standard of 
care,” even though all of the items in the checklist were agreed 
upon ahead of time by both parties.188 These holdings illustrate that 
Cirrus’s failure to deliver Flight Lesson 4a was not, on its own, the 
breach of a duty of care owed to the appellants. 
Next, the fact that neither Cirrus nor UNDAF are educational 
institutions does not take the case out of the scope of the 
educational malpractice doctrine. Courts from other jurisdictions 
have consistently held that the doctrine extends to any institution 
that “assume[s] educational responsibilities,” regardless of the 
context or setting.189 Here, both Cirrus and UNDAF assumed 
educational responsibilities by undertaking to provide transition 
training to Mr. Prokop. Even though Cirrus is an airplane 
manufacturer, the appellants’ claims require “an inappropriate 
review of educational policy and procedures.”190 
Finally, the assertion that the educational malpractice doctrine 
would insulate flight schools and other training programs from 
liability for negligent and wrongful conduct is unfounded. First, the 
 
 184.  Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., 796 N.W.2d 541, 553 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2011), aff’d, 816 N.W.2d 572 (Minn. 2012). 
 185.  See infra notes 186–188 and accompanying text. 
 186.  289 N.W.2d 112 (Minn. 1979). 
 187.  Id. at 117 n.8. 
 188.  567 N.W.2d 496, 504 (Minn. 1997); see also Mervin v. Magney Constr. Co., 
416 N.W.2d 121, 125 (Minn. 1987) (“This court has consistently held that the 
standard of care owed to others by a contracting party is not fixed by the terms of 
the contract.”). 
 189.  Gupta v. New Britain Gen. Hosp., 687 A.2d 111, 118 (Conn. 1996); 
see, e.g., Waugh v. Morgan Stanley and Co., 966 N.E.2d 540 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012); 
Dall. Airmotive, Inc. v. FlightSafety Int’l, Inc., 277 S.W.3d 696 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008); 
see also Glorvigen, 796 N.W.2d at 554 (noting that the educational malpractice bar 
can apply to parties that are “not primarily in the business of education”). 
 190.  Glorvigen, 796 N.W.2d at 554 (quoting Alsides v. Brown Inst., Ltd., 
592 N.W.2d 468, 473 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999)). 
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doctrine does not prohibit claims for injuries occurring during the 
course of instruction. Training programs and instructors, like 
traditional schools and teachers, still have a duty to exercise 
reasonable care to prevent injuries to students.191 Second, a student 
would still be allowed to bring an action “for breach of contract, 
fraud, or misrepresentation, if it is alleged that the institution failed 
to perform on specific promises,” such as “the failure to offer 
classes in a particular subject or to provide a promised number of 
hours of instruction.”192 The educational malpractice doctrine does 
not apply to such claims because “the essence of the plaintiff’s 
complaint would not be that the institution failed to perform 
adequately a promised educational service, but rather that it failed 
to perform that service at all.”193 Lastly, ineffective training schools 
would undoubtedly be subjected to marketplace penalties, even 
without corresponding civil liability. If a training school offered 
deficient programming and employed incompetent teachers, it 
would struggle to satisfy accreditation requirements.194 Likewise, 
members of the public would not attend a training school that 
offered subpar instruction. 
Overall, the educational malpractice doctrine is a viable 
alternative that the court should have considered in Glorvigen. 
While the doctrine is not without its criticisms, its application to the 
 
 191.  See, e.g., Tiemann v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 740, 331 N.W.2d 250, 251 
(Minn. 1983); Raleigh v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 625, 275 N.W.2d 572, 575 (Minn. 
1978); Kingsley v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 2, 312 Minn. 572, 574, 251 N.W.2d 634, 
635 (1977); Sheehan v. St. Peter’s Catholic Sch., 291 Minn. 1, 3, 188 N.W.2d 868, 
870 (1971). 
 192.  Alsides, 592 N.W.2d at 472–73. 
 193.  Id. at 473 (quoting Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 417 (7th Cir. 
1992)). Other jurisdictions that have adopted the educational malpractice 
doctrine have permitted these types of claims. See, e.g., CenCor, Inc. v. Tolman, 
868 P.2d 396, 400 (Colo. 1994) (holding that a school that “obligated itself to 
provide modern equipment in good working condition, qualified instructors, and 
computer training for all students, but did not fulfill those obligations” could be 
sued for breach of contract because such a claim was not necessarily one of 
educational malpractice); Ryan v. Univ. of N.C. Hosp., 494 S.E.2d 789, 791 
(N.C. Ct. App. 1998) (allowing the plaintiff to bring a breach of contract claim 
against a medical school for failing to offer a gynecological rotation on grounds 
that the claim “would not require an inquiry into the nuances of educational 
process and theories” (quoting Ross, 957 F.2d at 417)); Malone v. Acad. of Court 
Reporting, 582 N.E.2d 54, 58–59 (Ohio 1990) (holding that a school’s failure to 
maintain accreditation for paralegal program sounded in fraud, misrepresentation 
and breach of contract, and not educational malpractice). 
 194.  For FAA flight school and flight instructor certification and licensure 
requirements, see 14 C.F.R. § 61 (2013). 
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facts of the case would have been substantially more consistent with 
Minnesota precedent than the court’s actual holding. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Glorvigen, the Minnesota Supreme Court was confronted 
with the question of whether an airplane manufacturer, Cirrus, 
breached a duty in tort by failing to provide adequate training for 
the safe use of its product.195 In answering this question, the court 
properly concluded that the duty to warn does not include the duty 
to train. However, as this case note argues, the court employed 
inconsistent reasoning in determining that Cirrus did not 
voluntarily assume a duty to train. The court resolved the assumed-
duty issue by concluding that the breach of a contract duty cannot 
create liability in tort. This reasoning contradicts settled precedent 
concerning the economic loss doctrine.196 To avoid this result, the 
court should have concluded that the appellants’ claims were 
barred by the educational malpractice doctrine. By not reaching 
the issue of educational malpractice, the court missed an 
opportunity to definitively hold that there is no duty to effectively 
educate in Minnesota. In its place, the court created new precedent 
that may allow manufacturers of dangerous products to avoid 
liability in tort for personal injury simply by virtue of a contract. 
 
 195.  Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., 816 N.W.2d 572, 574 (Minn. 2012). 
 196.  See supra notes 46–63 and accompanying text. 
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